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NOTES.
CARS-CHARTO SUPPLY
CARRIERS-JURISDICTIoN--DUTY
'
ACTER OF VEHTCLES-"OIL TANK CAR CASEs "- Since the deci-

sion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Abilene
Oil Company case," it has been settled that a purely administrative
question arising under the Act to Regulate Commerce is primarily
and exclusively for the determination of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. This has repeatedly been applied in cases involving
questions as to the reasonableness of rates or as to whether they
are discriminatory, and questions -involving discrimination with

reference to car distribution.
'Texas

426 (19o).
(368)

On the question of car supply, Sec-

& Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Company, o4 U. S.

NOTES

tion One of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amefided by the Hepburn Act of i9o6, after defining "transportation" as including "cars
and other vehicles and all instrumentalities, and facilities of shipment or carriage," says that "it shall be the duty of every carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to provide and furnish such
transportation upon reasonable request therefor,

.

.

."

Under

this section questions at once -arise as to the extent to which the
enforcement of the obligation therein embodied calls for the determination of administrative questions.
That the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
on the one hand, and of the courts on the other, depends upon
whether the enforcement of this obligation requires the determination of an administrative or of a non-administrative question, was
declared in the case of PcnnsylvaniaRailroad v. PtiritanCoal Conpay.2 In that case, as in most of these cases, the railroad had a
rule for allotting cars to the shippers. It was said that if this rule
had been attacked as unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, and
if the action had thus involved scrutiny of the rule, an administrative question would have been presented over which the Commission would have had exclusive jurisdiction.S However, if the rule
is admitted to be reasonable, but the complaint is directed against
its unfair enforcement, or if the railroad has no rule for allotting
cars, then no administrative question is involved and a claim for
damages for failing, upon reasonable request, to furnish a shipper
with a sufficient number of cars to satisfy his needs may be enforced in either a Federal or, by virtue of the provisions of Section
Twenty-two of the Act,4 in a state court, without any preliminary
finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission; and this whether
the carrier's default was a violation of its common-law duty existing prior to the Act, or of the duty prescribed by Sectiofn One of the
Act as amended in i9o6.
237 U. S.

121

(I915).

See discussion of this case in 63 UNlvtsi7v

or PENNSYLVANIA LAw REvirwV 787 (June, 1915).

' B. & 0. R. R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co, 215 U. S. 481 (191o); I; C. C. v.
Illinois Central R. R., 215 U. S. 452 (1910); Morrisdale Coal Co. v. P. R. R,
230 U. S. 304 (1913).

' Section 22 declares that "nothing in this act contained shall ir any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies."
'Eastern Railway Co. v. Littlefield, 237 U. S. 140 (1915); Illinois
Central R. R. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co, 238 U. S. 275 (1915); P. R. R.
v. Clark Coal Co. 238 U. S. 456 (j9i5). In Vulcn Coal & Mining Co.
v. Illinois Central R. R., 33 1. C. C. R. 52 (1915), decided several months
before the Puritan Coal Company case, the Interstate Commerce Commission declared that the question as to the extent to which the railroad failed
to comply with the duty it owed the complainants to furnish cars upon
reasonable request therefor, was an administrative one of which the Com-

mission alone can take original jurisdiction. This does not agree with
the test of what is an administrative question as determined by the Puritan
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In this connection two recent decisions of our highest tribunal
are of importance. In PcnnsylvaniaRailroadv. Sonman Shaft Coal
Company," a suit for damages was brought in a state court against a
railroad for failure to furnish cars to a coal company. The conditions in the coal trade were normal and no question of discrimination was raised. Although the railroad had a rule for allotting
cars which it had been following, no attack was made upon this
rule. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the state
court could entertain the action consistently with the Interstate
Commerce Act, by reason of Section Twenty-two, which preserved
the existing common-law remedies. No administrative question
was involved, for, the conditions of the coal trade being normal,
the duty of the carrier to have furnished the cars arose from the
common law. Section One of the Act, as amended in 19o6, was,
for these purposes, regarded as merely adopting the common-law
rule. In reply to the railroad's contention that the reasonableness
of its rule of allotment was in issue and thus an administrative
question presented for the Commission, the Court answered that
where the conditions of trade are normal such a rule is unimportant, for the carrier's duty is measured by common law, that is, by
the reasonable requests of the shipper based upon his actual needs.
In the words of the Court: "It is only in times of car shortage
resulting from unusual demands or other abnormal conditions,
not reasonably to have been foreseen, that car distribution rules
originating with the carrier can be regarded as qualifying or affecting the right of a shipper to demand and receive cars commensurate
in number with his needs."
In the second case, known as the Oil Tank Car Cases,'
decided just one week after the Soninan Coal Conpany case, the
Commission had ordered the Pennsylvania Railroad to provide and
furnish tank cars in sufficient number to transport the normal
shipments of the complainant's oil. The Supreme Court of the
United States held, that an order to provide such special cars was
beyond the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Prior
to 19o6, the Commission had decided that the carrier's duty to
provide and furnish equipment for the transportation of commodities might expand with time and conditions so that the special
car would become the common car and the shipper's right to demand it would receive the sanction of the law. Thus cattle cars
and refrigerator cars had, through the growth of trade, become
Coal Company case. The decision of the commissioners has been appealed
from, and it has not yet been decided.
£37 S. C. R. 46, decided December 4, 19115.
'United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. The Pennsylvania Railroad: United States, Interstate Commerce Commission and CrewLevick Company v. The Pennsylvania Railroad. Decided December 11,
19x6. 37 S. C. R. 95.
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so essential to the safe carriage of commodities, that they had
received the sanction of the law, but it was the sanction of the
common law and not of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and the
remedy was in the courts and not in the Commission.$ With this
view of the carrier's obligation before the passage of the Hepburn
Act of 19o6, it remained for the Court to consider whether any
change had been inade by that Act. Section One of the original
Act of 1887, had defined "transportation," as including all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage; the Amendment. of i9o6, as
we have seen, defined it as including "cars and other vehicles and
all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or carriage." The
Court held that there -was no advance made or enlargement of
meaning by the new definition, but it was simply a useless tautology.
And also the addition to Section One of the words: ".
. it
shall be the duty of every carrier subject to the provisions of this
Act to provide and furnish such transportation upon reasonable
request therefor . .
. " were held not to bring the enforcement of this duty within the jurisdiction of the Commission. For
there was no question of the carrier's duty to furnish the instrumentalities of transportation either under the Act of 1887, or under
the Amendment of j9o6, and it had already appeared that the
Commission viewed the remedy as existing, under the former Act,
solely in the courts. The words were, but the expression of a
necessary implication, for, the duty having been imposed, it necessarily could be demanded.
Finally, it was argued that the Commission derived its power
from Section Fifteen of the Amendment of 191o, which gave that
body jurisdiction, among other things, over any regulations or
practices which were unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory. Applying this section, it was contended that the neglect to
prov ide or at least the refusal to furnish tank cars was a "practice."
The Supreme Court refused to follow such a construction which.
carried out to its logical conclusion would embrace every detail
of railroad operation, their thought being that "if Congress had
intended such a consequence with all that it implies of expense,
directly and indirectly, it would not have left its intention to be
evolved from obscure language, but would have put it in explicit
declaration." There being, then, nothing which showed that the
administrative power -and remedy of the Commission under the
Act of z887, had been enlarged by the subsequent amendments,
it followed that the order which they attempted to make was beyond their power.
What is the extent of the carrier's obligation to furnish equipment, in the light of these two recent decisions, both as to the num'Re Transportation, eic., of Fruit. To 1. C. C. 36o (x9o4): Rice v.

Cincinnati. 1. & B. R. Co.. s 1. C. C. 193 (1802); Scofield v. Lake Shore
& Michigan Southern R. Co., 2 1. C. C. 90 (i888).
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ber of cars, and as to the character of the vehicles? Regarding the
number of cars, the extent of the obligation is summarized in the
Sonman Coal Company case. In normal times the carrier's duty
is measured by common law, that is by the reasonable requests
of the shipper based upon his actual needs, and no administrative
question is ordinarily involved. In such a situation, jurisdiction
is not exclusively in the Interstate Commerce Commission, but an
be exercised equally by the Federal or a state court. While in
abnormal times, that is, in times of car shortage, the extent of
the obligation to furnish cars is one of reasonableness which
directly involves an administrative question and thus jurisdiction is
exclusively in the Commission." Regarding the character of
yehicles, the Oil Tank Car cases hold that the extent of such
obligation is measured entirely by common law and is enforceable
at no time by the Commission, but solely by the courts. Whether
the courts would compel the carrier to furnish special vehicles is
another question depending, among other things, upon the conditions of trade and the business of the shipper.
P.H.R.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PRocEss CLAUSE-RESTRICTIONS

ON USE OF LAND--An increasing community sense throws into
sharp relief the extremely individualistic attitude of the common
law. In the contemplation of the latter the right of the land-owner
extends usquc ad caclum, and, subject only to the limitation that he
inflict no injury upon another, he may use his property for any
purpose he sees fit. It is only when a nuisance is created that his
neighbors may invoke the aid of the courts. But the term nuisance
has become associated largely with smudgy chimneys, defective
reservoirs and cess-pools. Against the erection of structures repugnant to the artistic sensibilities of the neighborhood, there seems
to be no remedy.
It is not that esthetic considerations are above--or beneath the
jurisdiction of the courts. A municipality, it is now well settled,
may impose taxes for just such purposes; it may acquire land to be
used for parks, libraries, arf-galleries, convention balls . . .
provided only that it compensates the owner.' The point upon
which the law is less satisfactory is as to the right of a city to
enjoin the property owner from a use of his property which cannot
be technically termed- a nuisance?
The present attitude of the courts can be stated briefly.
9This is. of course, dictum by the court, based upon the words in the

Puritan Coal Company case.
'Attorney-General v. Willinis. 174 *Mas. 476 (u89g).
'Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., IFS Mass 348 (19o).
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"Esthetic considerations," it has been said, "are a matter of luxury
and indulgence." 3 "The preservation of the architectural symmetry
of Copley Square." is not a ground for restricting a property owner
from a normal use of his property.'
Statutes aiming to preserve or enhance the beauty of a community are numerous, ranging from those which for police as well
as for artistic purposes, limit the height of buildings in certain
sections," to those which prohibit the establishment of retail stores
in residential neighborhoods. 6 Wherever the constitutionality of
a statute of this type has been in issue, the individualistic test of
the common law has been rigidly applied. "The cut of the dress,
the color of the garment worn, the style of the hat, the architecture
of the building or its color, may be distasteful to the refined senses
of some, yet government can neither control nor regulate in such
affairs." I The same considerations have declared unconstitutional
a statute which forbade the erection of bill-boards or advertising
signs within a certain distance from a municipal boulevard.8 Unless
essential to the public health, the public safety or the public welfare, no restriction upon the uses to which land may be put will be
countenanced by the courts. A court will go further. It will inquire into the real purpose of any statute, and if it believes that
the act is only ostensibly and not primarily a police measure, it will.
not uphold iLO So also it may consider the aim of the act to be
police, and yet may hold it invalid because the execution of the act
is left to the arbitrary discretion of a few individuals.'0

In a very recent case a statute sought to prevent the erection
of bill-boards upon the Palisades of the Hudson." The act was
declared unconstitutional. While this latest decision is in accord
with the traditions of the American courts, it leaves open several

effective loop-holes by which the general purpose of such a statute
may be brought about. Civic beauty and civic safety are not
irreconcilable terms, and if an act can be justified as a valid exer-

cise of the police power, the fact that it incidentally conduces to
beautify the city, will not invalidate it.' - In many cases, too, esthetic
considerations have been taken into account by the courts. It has
"Cochran v. Preston. io8 Md. =a (z9o8).
'Attorney-General v. Williams. supra.
'Esbank v. Richmond. 26 U.- S. 137 (19T2).
' People v. Chicago. a6i Ill16 (1913).
'Curran Bill Posting Co. v. Dinver, 47 Col.
*Commonwealth

--

1 (igog.

v. Boston Adv. Co., 88 Mass. 348 (i9os).

'Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture School, z49 111. 436 (igit).
"'Bostock v. Lewis. 95 Md. 400 (19o2).
"State v. Lamb, 98 AtI. 459 (N. J. 1916).
"Welch v. Swasey,
(igoB).

193 Mass. 364 (z9o7).

Affirmed in 214 U. S. 91
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been judicially recognized that a manufacturing district must submit to annoyances which would be enjoined in a residential neigvborhood. 3 And the converse of the proposition is often decided
though seldom clearly expressed. In addition, an offensive odor
seems to be a nuisance per se, its effect on the health of the comnmunity being immaterial.' It is difficult to grasp the logical difference between this form of nuisance and an architectural monstrosity that is an eye-sore to surrounding residents. The practical
consideration that seems to determine the stand -of the courts is,
that the first, the nasal, sense is universal. No expert testimony
is necessary, and no conflict of testimony is likely. The artistic
sense, on the other hand, is localized in a comparatively few of the
esthetically cultivated, among- whom also there are apt to be
essentially divergent views as to what constitutes good taste.
Unfortunately the very material aspect of the question has
not been stressed. The man who opens up a laundry in a residential section may outrage the refined sensibilities of his neighbors. In so far the result is merely sentimental and properly disregarded by the law. But very often the value of property in the
vicinity is considerably lowered. The exercise of certain rights
of ownership by one party may reprive a hundred others from using their property in a normal manner. The use of one property
for manufacturing purposes may preclude the use of adjacent property for any but the same purpose.
The present attitude of the courts leaves much to be desired.
But it is definite. An alternative view would unsettle the property
rights of the community. In an extreme case, for example, it was
sought to prohibit the erection of residences near a drive-way which
skirted the shore of a bay, because they obstructed the view to the
bay and the breezes therefrom.14 The merits of such a controversy
cannot be decided by the courts, nor indeed by the, executive of
legislative departments under our conception of government. Another philosophy of government which has 'emphasized the paramount importance of the state has enabled the continental authorities to achieve a standard of municipal development which is the
envy of American cities. It is a curious paradoX, that at this time
when the collective sense is stronger than ever before in America,
paternalism in government is under a ban, and individual freedom
is deemed the special jewel of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.

B. WV.

INTERNATIONAL

LAW-CONTRABAND--CONFISATION

SEL CARYING CONTRABAND-In

OF VES-

the light of the present war condi-

tions, the problem of the penalty to vessels of neutrals for the car"Sullivan v.Steel Company, 268 Pa. 543 (904).
"'Quntine v. Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss. 483 (i886).

NOTES

riage of contraband to a belligerent, assumes a position deserving of
especial consideration.
The doctrine that commerce in contraband is free to citizeps
of a neutral State in so far as that State is concerned while to the
belligerent who is injured is left the right to confiscate the commodities in question, if they can be captured, was early announced in
this country.' And the present administration has affirmed it time
and again. The question as to when that right exists is, of course,
dependent upon, the rules of so-called International Law, as interpreted by the courts of the one or the other belligerent as the case
may be. Since the difficulties can only arise when a state of
war exists, and wars being comparatively infrequent, tribunals have
not been (n so safe a ground as in other matters usually brought
before them for judicial decision; nor can the psychological effect
of the fact that the respondent vessel was intended to aid the
enemies of their country be discounted 2 So that the question has
rather been the subject of diplomatic agreements as exemplified by
treaties,' or conferences between the representatives of the various
powers.
As late as in i9o8 such a gathering was held in London, to
which each of the powers was invited to submit a proposal for regulating the problem. It resulted in the issuance of the "Declaration
of London." 4 While this was not accepted in whole by any of the
powers, certain sections, notably Article 40, to be discussed later,

were definitely adopted by England and her allies and tentatively by
most civilized states.

It is first important to determine just what contraband, in this
sense, includes. In general it may be said to mean not only articles
such as arms, ammunition and other objects of immediate use in

war, but also many others which, though ordinary commerce in
times of peace, become contraband in war times, when the destination of such articles indicate that they are intended for the use

of the military or naval forces of the enemy.5 As early as the sixteenth century warring powers began to deny the right of contract
between neutral nations and their enemies, free from their inter'Am. State Papers. For. Rel. 7, i47 (1793); Id., 1, 646 (1796).
-"The truth is that the feeling of the country was deep and strong
against England, and the judges as individual citizens were no exception
to that feelirg. besides the court was not then familiar with the law of
blockade." Excerpt from a letter from Mr. Justice Nelson (U. S. Supreme
Court) to Mr. Lawrence. Quoted in Hall "International Law," p. 666.
" United States and France. De Martens, Rec. VII, io4 (8oo); United
States and Central America Now. Rec. V. 34 (1828).
'Signed February 26, igo9. Ratification advised by Senate, April 24,
1912.

"Fenwicke "Neutrality Laws of the United States," page 1o4. and see
the classification under "Declaration of London."

376

UNIVERSITY OF PEN¥NSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

ference. Warnings were issued, threatening the seizure of
certain commodities on their way to enemy ports. Hence the
name "contraband" as being contra to the ban or edict.6
At this time there existed two distinct schools, each entertaining well set principles as to the right of condemnation and confiscation. At the head of one stood France,? while England chainpioned the other." The British plan included besides goods absolutely
contraband, a list of so-called "Conditional Contraband." Goods of
this class, when captured, were not confiscated, but the taker paid
the owner thereof due value and also all freight charges. This proceeding was called "pre-emption."" On the other hand the French
stoutly denied the exercise of this right, but maintained the doctrine of strict accountability of the neutral. Necessarily many
articles, included in the English conditional lists, were held as absolute contraband by the advocates of this school. Both agreed,
however, that any belligerent might add to the list by warnings
issued before seizure.' 0 In view of the determination of both factions it is easy to see that no agreement might be proposed suitable
to both. In i9o7 at the "Convention at the Hague," in spite of
proposals, and counter proposals, the representatives were obdurate
and the question was passed over. In i908 at the London Conference, infra, the novel scheme of setting down certain articles, not
contraband, was adopted, but nothing further was accomplished.
Turning now to the liability of the carrier. The preseit status
of the law as exemplified by the recent case of the Hakan " is a
development of three successive stages. Before the Napoleonic
wars the prevalence of opinion was that neutral vessels carrying
contrabands of war were just as subject to capture and condemnation as were the goods themselves, 12 the theory being that the guilt
of him who makes possible the performance of the contract of sale,
i.e., the carrier, was just as great as the seller. Since the latter
upon capture lost his goods, the former should suffer a like fate.
The second stage was represented by the so-called "Indulgent
Rule" adopted in the American case of the Bertnuda,13 requiring
for the confiscation of the vessel bad faith on the part of the owner
thereof.24 This view is explained on the ground that the owner
'The first use of the word in this context was in the Treaty of Southhampton between England and the United Provinces (1625). Twiss "War,"
page 121.
'Dumont, t. 6, part 2, p. 266.
"Treaty of Southampton. See note 6, sup'ra.
'Admiralty Manual, Art. 64.
"Life and Correspondence of Sir Leoline Jenkins, v. 2, p. 751.
n i15 L T. R. 389 (Eng.1916).
The Neutralitet, 3 Ch. Rob. 295 (Eng. i8bO).
a"3 Wall. 514 (U. S. 1865).
" Such as concealment of papers, change of destination or a part ownership of both cargo and vessel
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of the vessel does not necessarily know the character of the cargo
and therefore should' not be compelled to suffer, having done no
affirmative wrong. However, since the defense is based in knowledge, proof of it to the owner destroys the immunity and the vessel
again becomes subject to seizure.
As said before Article 4o of the London Declaration, supra,
has been accepted by most states. It represents 'the transition to
the third stage and provides for the confiscation of the vessel, if
one-half the goods carried, in value, weight, volume or freight
is contraband. Under it the Hakan, supra, is decided. The defense raised was that the old American idea of inala fides in-the
owner prevailed, and that Article 4o, and its adoption by Orders in
Council was contra to International Law and invalid, but the court,
citing the proposition of the United States, at the London Convenion " as expressive of the change of sentiment, -adopted the rule
of Article 4o as controlling and firmly settled it as being the law
with its stamp of judicial approval.
P.F.N.

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcrAWARD ON HEARSAY EvIDENcE--Many of the Workmen's Compensation Acts of this country provide that the administrators of
the Act, Industrial Commissions, etc., are not to be bound by
the formalities of legal procedure in passing 6n the merits of cases
arising under the Act, and some even specifically point out that the
Commission or Referee may disregard the common law and
statutory rules of evidence and procedure other than those presented in the Workmen's Compensation Act itself. The purpose
of such enactments is, of course, that the utmost freedom shall be
allowed in the investigation of a claimant's right to compensation,
to the end that relief may be granted in Worthy cases as speedily as
possible. Under such statutory directions the question of the admissibility of hearsay evidence in proceedings under the Compensation Acts is of considerable importance. In a former note ' it was
pointed out that in nearly all jurisdictions the findings of fact of
the administrative body, hereafter called the Commission, are final
and not subject to review by the courts. It will be seen from that
note that in general the Commission must act within its powers
in making an award, that it has no right to act on mere supposition. guess work or conjecture, nor can it base an award on legally
incompetent evidence; and that it is generally agreed that the mere
"The proposals of the- United States to the conference are embodied
in the Naval Code of igoo with the- Amendment of 1903. They were prepared by Rear-Admiral Stockton, U. S. N., under The guidance of the Secretary of State. and endorsed by the President.
'64 UN v. or PE.%.,A. L Rv. 744, May, 1916.
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admission of What in a regularly constituted court of. law would be
incompetent evidence will not of itself invalidate an award. Therefore, in the light of he statute provisions referred to, we have
presented in this discussion the question: is pure hearsay legally
competent evidence on which facts may be found and an award
based?
The Court of Appeals of New York has answered the question
in the negative. In Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., - that court
laid down the rule that while the admission of hearsay evidence
was justified by -the statute,3 there must be some evidence of a
legally competent nature and of recognizedly probative value on
which an award may be based. In this case the workman was employed in delivering ice. The Commission found that on a certain
date while he was so engaged, the tongs slipped and a three-hundredpound cake of ice fell and struck him in the abdomen, causing an
epigastric hemorrhage. He was then taken to the hospital where
he developed delirium tremens and died a few days after the
alleged accident. The Commission's finding was based solely on
the testimony of witnesses who related what Carroll had told them
as to the cause of his injury. These statements were made* under
such circumstances that they could not be admitted as res gestac in
ordinary legal proceedings. On the other hand there was the direct
testimony of others that they were present at the time and place
when it was alleged that Carroll was injured, and that they saw no
accident whatever and saw no cake of ice fall.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission, but by a divided court.' Judge Howard in
delivering the opinion of the majority, decided that the Commission
was authorized and even bound to ignore all the formulated rules
of evidence heretofore established both by common law and by
statute, and that the spirit of the Compensation Act authorizes the
Commission to make its investigation in any manner it chooses,
wholly unfettered by any law previously invented by man, and
that it is to be bound neither by custom nor precedent. Judge
Woodward in a very able dissenting opinion held that the right to
compensation must be predicated on the determination that the
worker's earnings were cut off by "disability or death .
. resulting from an accidental personal injury

.

.

arising out

:218 N. Y. 435; 113 N. F. 507 (i916), reversing i69 App. Div. 450 (i9i5).
'New York Laws 1914, Chap. 41, Sec. 68: Technical Rules of Evidence
or Procedure Not Required. The Commission or commissioner or deputy
commissioner in making an investigation or inquiry, or conducting a hearing, shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or
by technical or formal rules of. procedure, except as provided by this chapter; but may make such investigation or inquiry, or conduct such hearing
in such manner as to ascertain the .substantial rights of the parties.
t 169 App. Div. 450 (N. Y. 1915), annotated in 64 Ux v. or PFNNA. L.
Rav. 325.

-NOTES

of and in the course of the employment" 5 and that before any
award can be made actual proof that the worker sustained an accident. which arose out of his employment must be given and that
the accident caused the injury to his person which resulted in disability or death, and that under no circumstances can the testimony
adduced to prove the plaintiff's claim be considered actual proof.
Section 68, therefore, cannot be construed to warrant the Commission fo make a finding and award without legal evidence to sustain
it, although the Commission has the right to admit proferred proof
freely and liberally with a view to developing all the facts, and
in fact to take any measures which will help it to clear up the
situation and lead it to a knowledge of the actual facts. To this
end technical rules of evidence cannot be allowed to hinder an
investigation. But no matter how much eXtraneous matter is thus
developed there must remain a residuum of legal proof upon which
an award may be based.
It will be seen that the fundamental difference between the
views above stated is this; the majority acts on the theory that the
Commission in its administration of the law needs merely to be convinced through its investigation of the justice of the claim, and may
arrive at' its conviction through any fair means, excluding supposition or conjecture, and if it believes hearsay testimony credible
it may act upon it; on the other hand the minority hold that the
change in the law affects merely the procedural limitations on a legal
inquiry, and actual proof, i. e., some evidence of a recognizedly probative value is essential to a just conclusion.
The same distinction is preserved in the Court of Appeal,
which by a divided court reversed the Appellate Division. Justice
Cuddeback, speaking for the majority, delivered an opinion approving the dissenting opinion of Judge Woodward, pointing out that
the only substantial evidence before the Commission was to the
effect that there had been no such accident as alleged. Chief Justice
Willard Bartlett concurred in the result, but indicated a broader
attitude towards the effect of hearsay under the Act" In a dis"New York Laws 1914, Chap. 41, Sec. xo.
"'The change in ihe fundamental spirit and purpose of our statutes
governing indemnity for industrial accidents has in no wise waived or
lessened the necessity for actual proof of the accident, its relation to the
employment, the resultant, injury, and the consequences of that injury."
Woodward, J, in 169 App. Div. 450, p. 455.
"'I think that the Workmen's Compensation Law permits the Commission to base an award upon hearsay evidence, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary; but where, as in the present case, the
hearsay evidence is* directly contradicted by the testimony of eye-witnesses
to the event, it does not suffice to raise any issue of fact. This view
accords with the liberal spirit of the enactment without giving to hearsay
evidence a sanction which I cannot believe the Legislature intended to
give it." Opinion of Willard Bartlett C. J., 113 N. E. 5o7, p. 5og; =18
N. Y. 435, P. 441.
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senting opinion Justice Seabury declares that the Legislature when
it enacted the law, did so to further the social interest of the community at large, and that in its interpretation the social point of
view should be considered rather than the juristic viewpoint developed through centuries of common-law tradition.' Justice Seabury also remarks on the inconsistency of holding, as do the majority, that such evidence may be admitted and yet an award may
not be based on it. "If the Legislature sanctioned the admission
of this evidence, it follows by necessary implication that it intended to authorize the Commission to act upon it." And again, to
sustain an award based on hearsay does not mean that the Commission must act on all hearsay, but only that it may act on it
when the circumstances are such that it is deemed by the Commission to be trustworthy.
In the administration of the English Act, the courts have
uniformly refused to allow awards based on hearsay, although
they generally allow a liberal interpretation of the doctrine of res
gestae.9 In an Irish case one of the Justices was of the opinion that
an award based on hearsay, particularly on statements made by a
deceased workman as to the cause of his injury, could be upheld on
the ground that in many instances there is no other possible evidence, 10 but in a later case the same Justice acceded to the general
English rule. 1
""The Workmen's Compensation Law is a new step in the field of
social legislation. We should interpret it in accordance with the spirit
which called it into existence. . . . This court is under no obligation
to see to it that laws enacted to remedy abuses arising from new industrial
and social conditions shall be made to square with ancient conceptions
of the principles -of the common law." Dissenting opinion of Seabury, J.
'"In cases of this kind we do give considerable latitude in admitting
the statements of deceased persons under the head of what is called res
gestar. But to admit these statements in evidence (statements by deceased
workman to his wife as to cause of his illness) would be to go far beyond
what the court has ever sanctioned and contrary to English law." Fletcher
Moulton, L. J., in Gibbey v. Great Western Ry. Co., 3 B. W., C. C. 135
Amys -v. Barton, s B. W. C. C. 117 (1912); and even where the statement was against the interest of the workman, Tucker v. District Council.
B. W. C. C. 296 (192).
'Cherry, L. J., in Wright v. Kerrigan, 4 B. W. C. C 432 (1911).
'"'I must confess that in Kerrigan's case (supra, note 1o). my opinion
was that there was no evidence whatever as to the cause of the injury
or as to its having been incurred in the course of the man's employment,
unless the statements of the man himself were admitted in evidence. I
was always under the impression that in.
such cases the best and, in many
cases, the only evidence that can-be obtained, as to the nature and effects
of an injury, is the statement- of the injured man himself, and that evidence as to the nature of the injury includes not only the physical fact
of the injury, but also the immediate cause. It is an additional part of
the statement as to the nature of the injury. However, the English decisions that have been cited to us hold otherwise, and must be followed
by us. It will have the effect of shutting out hundreds of cases where

NOTES

There are few American cases and all of them reach practically
the same conclusion. In Englebretson v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 2 the
court held that the rule against hearsay is not a mere "technical
rule of evidence," but is of a substantive nature, and that a statute
providing that the Commission "shall not be bound by the technical
rules of evidence," does not authorize an award on hearsay evi4
dence. 8 In Reck v. Whittlesberger,2
it is stated that the mere
admission of hearsay evidence is no ground for reversal as long as
there is other evidence of a substantial nature on which an award
can be based.
The question has not yet come before the Pennsylvania courts.
It remains to be seen whethdr they will adopt the strict construction given in the Englebretson Case, or the happy medium proposed
by Chief Justice Willard Bartlett which seems to be the most sensible and really just solution of the difficulty.,

EDIToR's NoTE-Since the note discussing the Carroll Case
was written, the case of Botto v. Hamilton has been decided by the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia." In ttat case a workman
suffered an injury to his arm, which resulted in blood poison and
his subsequent death. It was alleged that he fell while at work and
injured his arm there. The Board found this to be the case, and
based its finding and award on the testimony of the mother of the
workman as to what he told her four days after the accident as to
the cause of his injury, and the testimony of two other employes,
who saw him fall in such a way as to make it quite likely that the
wound which caused his death was received in the fall. It appears
that the purely hearsay evidence of the mother resulted in obtaining the corroborating testimony. The defendant attempted to have
the award set aside, on the ground that it was based on hearsay
evidence. The Court sustained it, however, on the ground that
no other evidence of the nature of an injury is obtainable. We cannot be
responsible for that." Cherry, L. J., in Donaghy v. Ulster Spinning Cor,
46 Jr. L T. 33 (1912).
'151 Pac. 421 (Cal. 1915). Accord, Employer's Assur. Corp. v. Ind.
Ace. Comm,
11 Pac. 423 (Cal. i9I5).
"Cal. Laws 1913, Chap. 176. See. 17.

si81 Mich. 463 (1914).

And see Fitzgerald v. Lozier Co., r54 N. W.

67 (Mich. 1915); Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51 (1gr3).

"Pennsylvania Act of 1915, P. L 736. Section 409 provides: "The
Board% findings of fact shall in all cases be final." Section 428 reads as
follows: "Neither the Board nor any Referee shall be bound by the technical rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or investigation."
' Botto v. Hamilton. C. P. No. 4, Philadelphia, No. 3555, Sept. Term.
ior6. Decided. opinion handed down January 8, 1917 Affirming decision
of Workmen's Compensation Board, 2 Pa. Dep. Rep. 2438 (Oct. 28, 1916).
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the direct testimony which was apparently elicited as a result of the
hearsay was of a sufficiently substantial character to justify the
award. On the question of hearsay the Carroll Case is cited as an
authority, and practically the same position adopted as in that case.
The Court views the Referee in a dual capacity, as an investigator
and as a judge of facts. In his capacity as an investigator he is
not to be hindered by technicalities, nor prevented from making use
of such informatiofi as"he*may receive in order to arrive at some
-substantial proof."I On the other hand, "when he comes to pass
on the evidence as a judge, he should be guided by the rules which
experience has taught are reliable." Further, "the rule excluding
hearsay is not 'technical.' It is fundamental." And Section 428 is
not broad enough to justify an award based solely on hearsay.
If the rule excluding hearsay is "fundamental" it is difficult
to understand how it may be admitted for any purpose, even for
eliciting further evidence of a more substantial character. Again,
hearsay when corroborated by other testimony and by the surrounding circumstances is deemed to furnish reliable grounds for
an award. Such corroboration, as in this case, only serves to prove
the initial trustworthiness of the hearsay. Would it be any the
less trustworthy because the supplementary direct evidence did not
happen to be discovered? The fallacy of the attitudeof the court in
the Carroll Case and in the Botto Case, seems to lie in the conception
of hearsay evidence as something -essentially unworthy of credence
under any circumstance. It is undoubtedly true that hearsay is in
many cases unreliable and apt to mislead the minds of those untrained to sift and weigh the probative force of evidence. To this
end it is wisely excluded from the consideration of juries in trials
at law. But here we have a body of administrative officers, trained
investigators, and competent to estimate at its true value the worth
of evidence adduced to prove claims before them. Yet if they are
convinced of the truth and justice of a claim, they are not allowed
to act in the absence of what is termed "substantial proof." When
the reason for the rule disappears, the rule itself should fall. There
are many exceptions to the rule against hearsay, because in certain
circumstances it is considered unlikely that such evidence would be
unreliable. It is more unlikely and improbable that a body of men
trained to the consideration and investigation of compensation
claims would be deceived by what we may call the "grosser" form
T.L.H.
of hearsay.

TORTS-INJURY TO INF.N Ts-NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS IMPUTED TO CHiLDREN-While the settled law in a majority of juris-

dictions in this country and England allows a child of tender years
recovery for injuries sustained while in the custody of a negligent

NOTES

parent, some courts deny recovery on the ground that the negligence
of the parent is imputable to the child. Thus the recent case of
Morgan v. Aroostook Valley R. R. Co.' is an example of the judicial
conservatism .which still cherishes the doctrine now being repudiated
by the general trend of decisions. In this case a child less than
two years old, while playing in its parents' yard, managed to escape
onto the street where it was permanently injured by a passing electric motor engine. While damages were allowed, it being found
that the parents knew of. no defect in the fence, the"court insisted'
that no recovery could be had were they negligent in their custody
of the child. It declared that a duty devolved on them to exercise
reasonable care in protecting the child and keeping it off the streets
and other places of danger and in case of failure so to act their
negligence would defeat any right of the child to recover, sifhce such
negligence was imputed in every case to the child.
The early American case of Harfield v. Roper 2 is a leading
authority for this doctrine of imputability. Under facts similar to
the Morgan case the court found for the defendant on the ground
that the want of due care on the part of the parents or guardians of
a child furnishes the same answer to an action by the child as
would its omission on the part of the plaintiff in an action by an
adult. There seemed to be a disposition on the part of this court
and those following it, to search for something to set off against the
negligence of the defendant. The child was where it should not
have been; no accident would have occurred had it not strayed into
the street. Someone is responsible for this contributory negligence
The child not being sui Jurts, is incapable of it; care and prudence
equal to its capacity are alone required of it. The parents must judge
for it if a place be one of danger and, having failed to do that,
the child must suffer along with the parents. The principle really
involved is that of group identification. The whole family had to
suffer for the failings of any member; a two-year-old child being
no exception. Everyone owes a duty so to conduct himself and
his machines as not to injure another; if that other is a lunatic, an
invalid, or an infant, some one owes the duty for him. If that
protector or custodian is deficient, his ward, having no higher rights,
than any other, must suffer with him. This doctrine, unsocial and
certainly illogical if carried out into all the variations of contract
law especially, is to-day still countenanced by some courts of the
country.3 It allows a defendant to escape liability where the plaintiff injured is a child of tender years. It awards damages where
that age is past, as-where an infant of eight or nine is injured, for
'98 AtI. 628 (Me. 1916).
.21 Wendell 61S (N. Y. x839).
*D. L. & W. Rwy. Co. v. Devore. 114 Fed, j55 (9o2); Holly v. Boston
Gas Light Co., 8 Gray 123 (Mass. 1857).
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such a one is able to take care of himself even. though his parents
have let him roam the streets. And hence because he is beyond
tender years their negligence is not imputed to him. In other words
the question is not whether an unavoidable accident has resulted
from the incapacity of the child or lunatic, but rather, there being
negligence on the part of the defendant, is he to be exonerated
whenever the victim of that negligence is a child or lunatic whose
guardian has carelessly allowed him to escape."
The minority courts seem to have ignored the true principle
concerned. What bearing has the negligence of a custodian on the
legal result involved where a child receives injuries while in the
custody of its parent or one in loco parcntis? The defendant owes
a duty to the child under all circumstances, the measure of it being
his notice of risk and his power to Avoid it. Why.then should the
diligence or the lack of it in the custodian, i giving occasion for
the risk to exist, vary that duty? This seems especially inexplicable
in those cases where he is not present at the scene of the accident.
The trend of decisions is fortunately in the direction of real justice
toward the extremely young and those otherwise in need of the
protection of others.
The better law as expressed by the highest tribunals in this

country and England repudiate the doctrine of imputability. It
declares that in an action by an infant in its own right for personal
injuries resulting from the negligence of a third party, the fault
or negligence of its parents or custodian, contributing to the injury,
cannot be imputed to the child.5 This is true even where the parents
have been warned of a certain danger. It applies to all manner of
cases, where the child wanders unprotected on the streets7 where it
is thrown from a trolley car,' where it is playing on the sidewalk
and gets into the highway." In no case will the contributory negligence of the parent he a defense unless the child has0 committed or
omitted an act which in an adult would be negligent.' Nor will the
defendant be excused when the parents have been negligent, if with

"Wharton on Negligence (2d Ed.), p.
bChicago G. W. Rwy. Co. v. Kowalski, 9z Fed. 310 (1899): Berry v.
Rwy. Co., 70 Fed. 6;9 (Ind. U. S. C. C. 1895): Rwy. Co. v. Wilcox. 24
N. E. 419 (Ill. i89); Rwy. Co. v. Schuster, x13 Pa. 472 (i886); Newman
v. R. R. Co., i At. iio2 (N. 3. i8go).
*Fink v. City of Des Moines, 89 N. W. 28 (Iowa ig9.)_
'Trumbo's Adm. v. City Street Car Co., 17 S. E. 124 (Va. j893).
'ashville- R. R. v. Howard, 78 S. W. io98 .(Tenn. ijo4).
Dehmann v. Beck, 7o N. Y. S. 29 (9m).
"Lynch v. Smith, io4 Mass. 52 (i87o): O'Brien v. McGlinchy. 68 Me.
,52 (1878): Rwy. Co. v. Robinson. 27 Ill. App. 26 (1887); McLain v. Van
Zandt, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 347 (1875).

NOTES
1
the exercise of proper care he could have avoided
the injury,2
or
2
part.2
his
on
if there has been gross negligence
Of course in all cases the contributory negligence of the parent
must be that of a custodian. So in Hennessey v. Brooklyn City R. R.
Co.,13 a child in its mother's arms in a carriage driven negligently
by the father was not denied recoirery because it was in the immediate custody of the mother and not 'of the father. This case is
an example of the departure from the idea of group identification.
At least it slAows that such a principle is incorrect, since it confuses
legal rights with family relationship. As one court has expressed
it, "the physical fact is that parent and child are not identical, either
in body or property rights." 24 The money which arises from damages for an injury to the child in its action against the wrongdoer
is the child's own property for the damage done is its own suffering
and. loss. "The -child, however young and helpless, and however
dependent upon the parent for care and protection, is nevertheless
a separate entity."1 5 Hence the injury which a wrongdoer- inflicts
upon an infant is not excused by the negligence of a third party
even though it be the parent. This is the sane and correct view
which justice demands and which the majority of jurisdictions now
agree upon.
There is a noteworthy exception to the general rule maintained
in several English cases, particularly that of -Waite v. Northeastern
Rv. Co.,' 6 where an infant plaintiff was denied recovery for a railway
accident occurring while the child was in its grandmother's custody.
The court held that the contributtory negligence of the .custodian
was a bar to recovery largely because the liability of the defendant
was limited by the terms of the contract of carriage, which was
upon the "implied condition" that the child was to be accompanied'
by the person having it in charge. The company issued a half
ticket on the understanding that it received the child as under
the control and subject to the management of the custodian. This
presents an interesting exception to the great trend of authority and
shows but one more of the many possible phases which the relation
of parent and child can assume in the law of negligence.

H.D.S.
"Donahoe v. Wabash. etc., Rwy. Co., 83 Mo. 543 (1884); Connery v.
Slavin. 23 N. Y. Week. Dig. 545; (j886); Baltimore City Pass. Rwy. Co.
v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 535 (876).
"Schierhold v. R. R. Co, 40 Cal. 447 (871); Kenyon v. R. R. Co., 5
Hun 479 (N. Y. 1875).
"39 N. Y. Supp. 8o5 (86).

"Profit v. Chicago G. AV. Rwy. Co., 91 Mo. App. 369 (xgoa).
lZbid., p. 377.
2;

Ellis, B. & E 719 (1858).

